























THE POTENTIAL IN FREGE’S THEOREM
WILL STAFFORD
Abstract. Is a logicist bound to the claim that as a matter of analytic truth there is an actual
infinity of objects? If Hume’s Principle is analytic then in the standard setting the answer appears to be
yes. Hodes’s work pointed to a way out by offering a modal picture in which only a potential infinity was
posited. However, this project was abandoned due to apparent failures of cross-world predication. We
re-explore this idea and discover that in the setting of the potential infinite one can interpret first-order
Peano arithmetic, but not second-order Peano arithmetic. We conclude that in order for the logicist
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§1. Introduction.
1.1. Potentially Infinite Models. In the non-modal setting, Frege (1893; Heck, 1993)
essentially proved that second-order Peano arithmetic, PA2, is interpretable in the theory
HP
2, which consists of the Second-order Comprehension Schema and Hume’s Principle:
∀X,Y (#X = #Y ⇔ ∃ bijection f : X → Y ).(HP)
I would like to thank the audience at the Logic Colloquium 2016 in Leeds and the UCI Logic Seminar
2017 for their questions and comments, and Tim Button, Jeremy Heis, Richard Mendelsohn, Stella Moon,
Sean Walsh, and Kai Wehmeier for their helpful feedback.
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Hume’s Principle characterises the cardinality operator #, read ‘the number of’ or ‘oc-
tothorpe’, as a type-lowering function that takes equinumerous second-order objects to the
same first-order object. This definition can be motivated in the finite case by examples
such as checking one has the same number of knives and forks by setting them out in pairs.
Formally, Frege’s result is:
Theorem 1.1 (Frege’s Theorem). There is a translation from the language of PA2 to the
language of HP2 that interprets PA2 in HP2.
The formal definition of the theories mentioned here can be found in Appendix A. Frege’s
Theorem has traditionally been regarded as philosophically important because it is supposed
to show that we can derive all arithmetical theorems from an epistemically innocent system.
This requires that Hume’s Principle is analytic. However, on the usual semantics, Hume’s
Principle is only true on domains with at least a countable infinity of objects. This commits
logicists like Frege to the analytic existence of an actual infinity of objects (Boolos, 1998,
pp. 199, 213, 233; Hale and Wright, 2001, pp. 20, 292, 309; Cook, 2007, p. 7).
A commitment to a potential infinity, in contrast, isn’t a commitment to how many things
there actually are, just how many are possible. This is a much safer area in which to make
analytic claims. Here we show that some but not all of the mathematics of the actual
infinite is recoverable in the setting of the potential infinite. And so, to avoid problematic
ontological commitments the logicist must also weaken the mathematics they recover.
To do this we must decide how to represent Hume’s Principle. Below we will define ‘the
number of’ operator # in a semantic manner. However, we are convinced that this is simply
a convenience and we can think of our models as defining # as satisfying Hume’s Principle
with the additional criteria that this function is rigid across worlds. An axiomatization
would consist of the following modification of Hume’s Principle:
✷∀X,Y (#X = #Y ⇔ ∃ bijection f : X → Y ),
plus a principle to rigidify the # operator. This would require working in a hybrid modal
logic where worlds could be saved and recalled such as Williamson (2013, p. 370).1 However,
we leave the details of this approach for future work. As the modification is so minimal,
the move to the potentially infinite doesn’t undermine the justifications offered for Hume’s
Principle. The syntactic priority thesis can still be argued for as we can identify the be-
haviour of terms in a modal setting as well as in a non modal setting. Similarly if we think
that abstraction principles offer implicit definitions then this justification works as well in
the modal setting.
The rigidity of the octothorpe is important for the success of the project here. However,
by assuming that it is rigid we are presuming that ‘the number of’ operator is rigid. Whether
this is the case in natural language is an empirical question (e.g. Stanley, 1997). We do not
address this issue here, but two things are worth noting. First the question of the rigidity
of ‘the number of’ is not the same question as e.g. whether the number of planets varies
between worlds. This is because we do not apply the operator to predicates but rather to
sets which do not vary their membership across worlds. The second is that this setting does
rule out the possibility of multiple different number structures in the different worlds, e.g.
the numbers being von Neumann ordinals in one world and Zermelo ordinals in another.
This means that a certain kind of referential indeterminacy which has a prominent place in
1For those familiar with hybrid systems the axioms needed is ↑ ✷∀ X, y ↓ [#X = y → ✷#X = y].
However, this will not play a role in what follows.
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philosophy of mathematics cannot be addressed in this setting as we have presumed against
it (Benacerraf, 1965; Button and Walsh, 2018, ch. 2).
To set up our result, we define a set of second-order Kripke models, which we will call
potentially infinite models. This idea comes from Hodes (1990, p. 379), although he does
not place exactly these constraints on the accessibility relation. We want the models to
be nearly linear sequences of worlds (if there are two worlds neither of which accesses the
other, there is a third world they both access), where later worlds are possible from the
perspective of earlier worlds but not the other way around. Each of these worlds should
contain only a finite number of objects as we are assuming actual infinities are impossible,
and the number of objects should increase from one world to the next. Each world will
have its own second-order domain, which as the worlds are finite, will be the full powerset.
The octothorpe will implement Hume’s Principle by taking sets of the same cardinality to
a unique object and this object will not change from one world to the next. We define the
models formally as follows:
Definition 1.2. A potentially infinite (PI) model is a quadruple M = 〈W,R,D, I〉 in the
modal signature with second-order quantification and with # and a as the only non-logical
symbols, such that the following conditions are met:
1.2.1. W is countably infinite and R is a directed partial order,2
1.2.2. the first-order domain of w, written D(w), is non-empty and finite for all w ∈W ,
1.2.3. for each n ≥ 1, the range of the second-order n-ary relational quantifiers at w is
P(D(w)n) consisting of all subsets of the n-th Cartesian power (D(w))n of D(w),
1.2.4. if w, s ∈W such that R(w, s) and w 6= s, then D(w) ( D(s),
1.2.5. the function a : ω → D (where D is
⋃
w∈W D(w)) assigns to each number n a distinct
element an in one of the first-order domains, and for all w ∈W , the cardinality of X
is n if and only if #X = an at w. More formally, for # and all w the interpretation
function is defined as follows: I(#, w) = {〈X, a|X|〉 | ∃s ∈W X ∈ P(D(s))}.
Remark 1.3. Three brief remarks on this definition:
First, conditions 1.2.1-4 define a PI model as a directed partial order of ever-increasing
finite domains. This means that if we have several objects existing in different possible
worlds we can always move to a world where they all exist.
Second, condition 1.2.5 defines the cardinality operator # using metatheoretic cardinality
|X |. It is sufficient for Hume’s Principle to hold that # picks-out cardinality, and so condition
1.2.5 ensures that all potentially infinite models are models of Hume’s Principle. One reason
we need P(D(w)2) from 1.2.3 is because the quantifier over graphs of functions in Hume’s
Principle ranges over this set.
Third, condition 1.2.5 also ensures that the interpretation of the octothorpe is rigid. That
is, the octothorpe is interpreted as the same relation at every world. Because of this nothing
will be lost if we write #X = x and don’t specify the world of evaluation. In fact, while
we define #X using the ai’s, we could have instead simply defined it as rigid and satisfying
Hume’s Principle and this along with directedness would ensure the ai’s exist.
This definition can obscure the simplicity of the idea here, as such it helps to give several
examples. The simplest potentially infinite model we can construct is the following:
Example 1.4. The minimal potentially infinite model is (ω,≤, D, I) where D(n) =
{0, . . . ,n} and the interpretation function I interprets octothorpe as cardinality in the










(a) The minimal model
0 1 2 · · ·
0 1 · · ·0 2 1 2 · · · · · ·
0 1 2 · · ·0 1 3 · · ·
(b) The subset model
Figure 1. Examples of potentially infinite models
metalanguage.3 That is, I(#, w)(X) = n if and only if |X | = n. The minimal model is
illustrated in Figure 1a. When working with such a model we see that a number can be
missing from a world even if a set of that cardinality is present. So I(#,1)({0}) = 1 and
1 ∈ D(1), but I(#,1)({0,1}) = 2 and 2 /∈ D(1) even though {0,1} ⊆ D(1).
A less simple but similarly elementary model makes use of the non-empty finite subsets of
the natural numbers. This model helps illustrate a non-linear R relation:
Example 1.5. Let the subset model be (P(ω)<ω − {∅},⊆, D, I) where D(X) = X and
again the octothorpe is cardinality. The subset model is illustrated in Figure 1b. Note
that if we have worlds X0, . . . , Xn we can always find an accessible world whose domain
is
⋃n
i=0Xi. For example, {0,1}, {3}, {100, . . . ,200} are all finite subsets of the natural
numbers, none of which access each other, however, their union {0,1,3,100, . . . ,200} is
also a world, which they all access.
It is easy to generate unintended models from these two cases. Using the minimal model,
for example, we can define the 3-0 swap model:
Example 1.6. The 3-0 swap model takes 0 and 3 in the domain of the minimal model and
switches them around. So D(0) = {3}, D(1) = {3,1}, D(2) = {3,1,2}, D(3) = {3,1,2,0}
and then for all n ≥ 3, we have that D(n) exactly as it is in the minimal model.
These models should help illustrate the intuition behind the potentially infinite models.
They will also be helpful when we need counterexamples to claims later in the paper.
We can now define satisfaction for potentially infinite models using a standard semantics
for quantified modal logic, such as in Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998). Three things to note
first: (1) Our quantifiers are actualist, but free variables may be assigned to objects in any
world. (2) Set variables are interpreted rigidly across worlds. That is the membership of a
set doesn’t change depending on the world. (3) To simplify the notation, instead of variable
assignments, we work as though we had a rigid name for every object in the models. Recall
that M, w  ϕ means that given any replacement of free variables with the added constants
we evaluate ϕ as true in M at world w. With this in place, the notion of potentially infinite
models induces a natural validity relation, which we define as follows:
Definition 1.7. We say that ϕ is true in all potentially infinite models, or PI ϕ, if for
all potentially infinite models M and worlds w ∈W we have M, w  ϕ. We define ϕ PI ψ
as for all models M and worlds w ∈W , if M, w  ϕ then M, w  ψ.
The consequence relation here is defined locally rather than globally (Fitting and Mendel-
sohn, 1998, p. 21). This is because the deduction theorem holds for the local consequence
relation but not the global one (Fitting and Mendelsohn, 1998, p. 23).
3I will use bold face numbers for the numbers in the metalanguage.
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1.2. Main Results. We will now state our two main results which together show that we
can interpret the first-order theories of first-order Peano arithmetic PA1 and first-order true
arithmetic TA1, but not the second-order theories of second-order Peano arithmetic PA2 and
second-order true arithmetic TA2, in theories defined in terms of potentially infinite models.
A deductive theory for second-order modal logic with rigid operators would be unwieldy
and the complications caused by it would be likely to obscure the insights provided by
the Kripke semantics. Hence, we leave development of a deductive theory for future work.
We can define a theory just in terms of the potentially infinite models. This theory will be
stronger than anything we could produce deductively because it does not admit nonstandard
models of the natural numbers. Because of this we will call it the external theory of the
potentially infinite or EPI:
EPI = {ϕ | PI ϕ}.(1)
To capture something closer to what can be deduced from the models we need to use
the model-theoretic validity relation defined above, relativised to a weak metatheory. The
theory ACA0 is a subsystem of PA
2 which only has comprehension for first-order formulas.
More information about this theory can be found in Appendix A. Since we can code finite
sets of natural numbers as natural numbers in ACA0, we can define the property of being a
potentially infinite model in this theory, along with the associated validity notion PI. This
gives us the internal theory of the potentially infinite or IPI:
IPI = {ϕ | ACA0 ⊢ ‘PI ϕ’}.(2)
Intuitively, this theory is every formula that can be proven valid on potentially infinite
models, given the weakest metatheory that can formalise the models. A full definition is
given in Appendix B.4 The definition of interpretation is traditionally restricted to theories
in the same logic, whereas in this setting EPI and IPI are theories in second-order modal logic
but PA1, PA2, TA1, and TA2 aren’t modal theories. So, to state and prove our main results
we need a more general notion of generalised translation and interpretation which captures
those interpretations which involve not just different theories but different logics. This is
defined in section 5. Our first main result is:
Theorem 1.8. (i) There is a generalised translation from the language of PA1 to the
second-order modal language with octothorpe that interprets TA1 in EPI.
(ii) There is a generalised translation from the language of PA1 to the second-order modal
language with octothorpe that interprets PA1 in IPI. Further, this is a PA
1-verifiable
generalised interpretation.
This result is proven in Section 5. The translation used is based on one offered by Linnebo
(2013) in the setting of modal set theory. The key difference, compared with the standard
notion of translation, is that “for all” is translated as “necessarily for all” and, similarly,
“there is” is translated as “possibly there is.”
The first theorem shows that the PI models capture a significant amount of mathematics.
However, we cannot strengthen the result to second-order theories of arithmetic as our
second main theorem shows:
Theorem 1.9. (i) There is no generalised translation from the language of PA2 to the
second-order modal language with octothorpe that interprets TA2 in EPI.
4We picked the weakest theory because we are interested in what is deducible from PI models and if we
strengthen the metatheory IPI will be strengthened in ways that reflect what the metatheory thinks about
finite sets (which can code consistency statements).
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(ii) There is no generalised translation from the language of PA2 to the second-order modal
language with octothorpe that PA2-verifiably interprets PA2 in IPI.
For both EPI and IPI, the results follow from the fact that PI models are Π
1
1 definable. And
this follows because all of the worlds are finite. Because of this, PI models are representable
in reasonably weak theories of second-order arithmetic. But then limitive results about
what theories can represent about themselves will stop theories that can represent EPI and
IPI being interpretable into EPI and IPI.
These results are important because they show that less mathematics is analytic on the
philosophical perspective which motivates the potentially infinite models than on the tradi-
tional perspective. The external theory cannot recover TA2 but only TA1. And the internal
theory cannot recover PA2 but only PA1. Further, PA2 has traditionally been the target of
Fregean interpretation results as it allows for the recovery of analysis and much of mathe-
matics.5 Analysis can be coded in second-order Peano arithmetic, as real numbers can be
coded as sets of rationals, which in turn can be coded as naturals. This means that Frege’s
theorem already accounts for a larger expanse of mathematics than it might first appear. If
we try to avoid the claim that it is analytic that there are actually infinitely many objects,
however, it then seems we will not have managed to recover as much mathematics. If we
are looking to show that mathematics is analytic, we have moved further from our goal.
However, we have still captured a substantial chunk of our most frequently used math-
ematics. Feferman (2005, p. 613) has argued that all scientifically applicable analysis can
be developed in PA1 or a conservative extension of it.6 If this is correct then we can still
recover the mathematics for which an explication of its truth is most philosophically fruitful,
namely the mathematics which we rely on when we act in the world. One might wonder why
a logicist would care about whether or not the mathematics recovered is used. But it seems
we should keep an open mind to different parts of mathematics being justified in different
ways. Maybe something as fundamental as first-order arithmetic turns out to be analytic,
but it seems unlikely that the same is true of the higher reaches of set theory. With this in
mind, it should not be damaging that not all mathematics turns out to be analytic.
1.3. A Diversity of Modal Logicisms. The idea of using the potentially infinite as a
foundation of logicism has a pedigree in the work of Putnam and Hodes, and more recent
work on modal foundations of mathematics and on variants of Frege’s theorem in different
logics. Putnam suggested that by accepting a modal picture of mathematics we could avoid
being Platonists about the numbers or committing to how many objects there actually are.
This is stated most clearly when he writes:
‘Numbers exist’; but all this comes to, for mathematics anyway, is that (I) ω-
sequences are possible (mathematically speaking); and (2) there are necessary
truths of the form ‘if α is an ω-sequence, then . . . ’[.] (Putnam, 1967, pp. 11–12)
Hodes took on this idea, but he was sceptical of the existence of actual infinities. He thought
that ‘[a]rithmetic should be able to face boldly the dreadful chance that in the actual world
there are only finitely many objects’ (Hodes, 1984, p. 148). His solution made use of the
idea of the potentially infinite rather than the actually infinite. He appealed to modality
5Demopoulos (1994, 238 n26) points out that Frege often uses arithmetic when he means something
broader including analysis.
6For example, “By the fact of the proof-theoretical reduction of W to [PA1], the only ontology it commits
one to is that which justifies acceptance of [PA1].” (Feferman, 2005, p. 613) Feferman works in a system W
which contains types for the naturals, the cross product and partial functions. The full classical analysis of
continuous functions can be carried out in W . (Feferman, 2005, p. 611)
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and in particular the modality that seems to be implicit in our concept of number: the idea
that it is always possible to add 1 (Hodes, 1990, p. 378).
However, by 1990, Hodes concluded that the reduction of mathematics to higher-order
modal logic had failed. Hodes describes the problem as follows:
The problem is simple: relative to [a model of Hume’s Principle] for a type-0
variable v, ✸(∃v)(N (v)& . . . ) “moves us” to other worlds u and then has us seek
a witnessing member of [the natural number in the model] in [the domain of u];
we may find one, but then have no way “back” to w to see what hold [sic] for it
there. (Hodes, 1990, p. 388)
So we might know that there possibly exists a number with a property, but in Hodes’s
system, we have no way of returning to our original world to use what we have found. For
example, if we find the number of a set in some world, we have no assurance that this
number is available for us to talk about in the world the set came from. It is only known
that it is the number of the set in the world the number exists in. The difficulty identified
here is with cross-world predication, which occurs when we want to say something about an
object in one world and how it relates to objects in another world (Kocurek, 2016).
In what follows we will show that the problem is not with cross-world predication per se.
Both by working directly with the models, but also by allowing the octothorpe to be rigid,
we can mimic some of the effects of cross-world predication. Yet in this setting we recover
some but not all of the arithmetic recovered by Frege’s theorem. Indeed, our main results,
Theorems 1.8 and 1.9, show that the situation is more complicated than Hodes suggested,
and that a partial realisation of his project is possible.
There are two recent trends in the study of logicism which this project is connected to.
First, Studd (2016) has suggested that the modal setting is an attractive one for the logi-
cist because it would help to solve the bad company objections. Unlike here, Studd’s is
concerned with inconsistent abstraction principles and in particular set abstraction. This
is interestingly connected to the näıve conception of set because one can think of the un-
restricted set Comprehension Schema as similar in spirit to a modal version of Basic Law
V. While work in this area goes back to Parsons (1983), it has been pursued recently by
Linnebo (2013; 2018). Much of Linnebo’s work has been on set theory. The concerns there
are very different from ours, as it make little sense in set theory to worry about the actual
infinite not existing and set theory is generally treated in first-order logic.The work in this
paper takes inspiration from the results presented in Linnebo (2013) and (2018) and makes
use of a similar method of translating between the modal and non-modal setting. How-
ever, while the dynamic abstraction principles discussed by Linnebo (2018) resemble the
behaviour of the number of operator, his preferred abstraction principle for arithmetic is
ordinal abstraction (Linnebo, 2018, Ch. 10.5), whereas in this paper we work with a modal
version of Hume’s Principle, a cardinality principle.
Second, there has been a lot of recent work on whether Frege’s Theorem still holds when
the logic is modified in certain ways. Bell (1999) and Shapiro and Linnebo (2015) have
shown that Frege’s Theorem is available in the intuitionistic setting. Burgess (2005) and
Walsh (2016) found that a version of Frege’s Theorem is possible in a certain predicative
setting. Kim (2015) proves a version of Frege’s Theorem in a modal setting. This employs
an axiomatised version of the ‘the number of F ’s is n’ as a binary relation, instead of the
traditional type-lowering ‘number of’ operator. Kim recovers the axioms of PA but finds
that a restricted version of HP2 holds. The modality used is S5 and meant to represent
logical possibility, not potentiality. Because of this Kim’s system does not have the same
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structure of our models, where the numbers slowly grow. Closer in spirit to the work
here is that on finite models of arithmetic by Mostowski (2001). There he considers initial
sequences of the natural numbers and what holds over all such models. These have a clear
connection to the minimal model discussed above. Urbaniak (2016) has taken Mostowski’s
models and worked with them in a modal setting. They have shown that Leśniewski’s typed,
free logic with modal quantifiers, which proves a predicative version of HP2, can interpret
PA
2. Our setting is quite different from that of Urbaniak’s paper as Leśniewski’s typed, free
logic differs dramatically from the one we work in here. The work in this paper proceeds
by looking at whether a version of Frege’s Theorem is available in a classical second-order
modal setting. Unlike these other results, we find that a modal version of Frege’s Theorem
for PA2 is not possible, as shown by Theorem 1.9.
1.4. Outline of paper. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 expands the
potentially infinite models’ language to include the language of arithmetic. In Section 3
we show that using the expanded language the potentially infinite models satisfy a weak
theory of arithmetic equivalent to a modal version of Robinson’sQ. In Section 4 we define the
inductive formulas of the language and show that induction holds for them. This allows us to
show Theorem 1.8, that TA1 is interpretable in our external theory and PA1 is interpretable
in our internal theory, in Section 5. In Section 6 we show that no natural interpretation of
PA
2 is possible by proving Theorem 1.9.
§2. Definitions for a Modal Grundlagen. Just as Frege in the Grundlagen defined
the numbers and the relations on them using only the ‘number of’ operator, here we show
how modified versions of Frege’s definitions can do this in the setting of the potentially
infinite.7 Proving that these definitions satisfy the usual arithmetical axioms will occupy
us in §§3–4. In this section we simply set out the definitions themselves and say a word
about their motivation. While entirely rigorous, it is our hope that, as in the Grundlagen,
the definitions will be intuitive and correspond to our understanding of cardinal numbers.
The first definition is easy and does not require any of the modal apparatus. We simply
let 0 = #∅. This follows Frege (1884, §74 p. 87) explicitly, who said that zero is “the
Number which belongs to the concept ‘not identical with itself’”.
Next we must define the successor, as the other definitions rely on it. The definition here
is like the one offered by Frege, but it differs by allowing the sets which witness that one
object is the successor of another to be merely possible. This is to ensure that if an object
is ever the successor of another, then it is the successor of that object in every world where
they both exist. This property will be important in the proof of induction. The definition of
successor, in plain terms, is: one object is the successor of another just in case it is possible
that there are two sets, which differ by one object and the successor is the number of the
larger set, and the predecessor is the number of the smaller set. Figures 2a and 2b illustrate
the two ways this can be done, resulting in two definitions of the successor:
Definition 2.1.
Sxy ≡ ✸∃G, u[Gu ∧ (y = #G) ∧ (x = #(G − {u}))](3)
7This has some precedent in Hodes (1990, p. 383). However, whereas we (and Frege) first define successor
and then use this to build the other definitions, Hodes takes ‘less than or equal to’ as his primitive. In his
system a number N (understood as a higher-order object) is less than or equal to another number N ′ just
in case it is possible that there are two other second-order objects A and A′ each with the same number
of objects as N and N ′ respectively and A is a subset of A′. That this has parallels with the definition of
successor offered here will be clear on inspection.


















b = #X ∪ {x}
(b) Diagram of when a is suc-










c = #X ∪ Y
(c) Diagram of when c is the
addition of b and c.
Figure 2
S′xy ≡ ✸∃F, u[¬Fu ∧ (x = #F ) ∧ (y = #(F ∪ {u}))](4)
The first of these definitions simply adds the possibility operator to the definition of successor
suggested by Frege (1884, §76 p. 89). These definitions are equivalent: to see this, simply
consider F = G− {u} and G = F ∪ {u}.8 In what follows we will simply use the definition
that is most convenient and will write S for both.
The definition of addition is similarly intuitive. The relation + holds between three objects
a, b, and c such that it is possible that there are disjoint sets X and Y of cardinality a and
b respectively, and c is the cardinality of X ∪ Y , the union of the two disjoint sets. This is
illustrated by Figure 2c and can be written formally as:
Definition 2.2.
+(a, b, c) ≡ ✸∃X,Y (a = #X ∧ b = #Y ∧ c = #X ∪ Y ∧ (X ∩ Y ) = ∅)(5)
For c to be the result of multiplying a and b we need a set B of cardinality b and for each
element x of B a set Ax of cardinality a. The Ax’s must all be disjoint. And c must be the
cardinality of the union of all the Ax’s. To define the Ax’s we define a binary relation P
that holds between x in B and all y in Ax. So Ax is {y | Pxy}.
Definition 2.3.
(6) ×(a, b, c) ≡ ✸∃X,P [#X = b ∧ ∀x ∈ X(#{y | Pxy} = a)
∧ ∀x, y ∈ X(x 6= y → {z | Pxz} ∩ {z | Pyz} = ∅) ∧#
⋃
x∈X
{y | Pxy} = c]
The definition of the natural numbers is more complicated and require us to define the
notion that one number follows another in the ordering of the natural numbers. We will
make use of Frege’s definition from the 1879 Begriffsschrift (1967, §III pp. 55 ff; 1884,
§79 p. 92 ff). Russell and Whitehead (1910, p. 316) called this relation the ancestral relation
because a good example of what it does is define the relation ‘ancestor of’ from the relation
‘parent of’. The strong ancestral of ϕ holds between two objects a and b just in case b is
contained in every set such that the set is closed under ϕ and the set contains everything
a bears ϕ to. So, we can define someone’s ancestors as everyone who is in every set that
contains their parents and the parents of everyone in the set. It is not guaranteed that a
bears this relation to itself, and so we also define the reflexive weak ancestral.
8For easy of readability, we will use set theoretic notation as a convenient short hand for concepts formed
using the language of the model. So F ∪ {u} is used for the concept given by Xx ↔ (Fx ∨ x = u).
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Definition 2.4 (The strong ancestral).
ϕ+(a, b) ≡ ∀X [(∀x, y(Xx ∧ ϕ(x, y) → Xy) ∧ ∀x(ϕ(a, x) → Xx)) → Xb].
Definition 2.5 (The weak ancestral).
ϕ+=(a, b) ≡ ϕ+(a, b) ∨ a = b.
Using this definition, we define a natural number as an object that is some finite number of
successor steps from 0, assuming 0 exists.
Definition 2.6 (Natural Number).
Nx ≡ S+=0x ∧ ∃y(y = 0).
This definition closely parallels Frege’s, though the definition of S is different. The existence
claim is added because in the modal setting 0’s existence cannot be assumed. For example,
0 does not exist at worlds 0, 1, and 2 in the 0-3 swap model, and, as 0 is not a member
of infinitely many finite subsets of the natural numbers, 0 does not exist at infinitely many
worlds in the subset model. In these worlds nothing is a natural number.
2.1. Some useful results. The following six lemmas will help explain the behaviour of
N in the models. We admit the proofs as they do not pose any particular difficulty. For the
following Lemmas, recall Definition 1.7 where PI ϕ was defined as ϕ is true in all worlds in
all potentially infinite models. First, note that the set defined by N at a world satisfies the
antecedent of S+0x. Intuitively, the idea here is that if x is in every set containing 0 and
closed under S, and Sxy, or S0y, then y must also be in every set with these properties.
Lemma 2.7. PI ∃x(x = 0) → ∀y(S0y → Ny))
Lemma 2.8. PI ∀x, y(Nx ∧ Sxy → Ny)
It follows immediately from this that if x exists at a world and at that world Ny and Syx
then Nx. However, that doesn’t mean N is the set of all numbers across all worlds as N
only holds of objects which exist at the world of evaluation. This contrasts with our other
definitions where the objects need not exist at the world.
Lemma 2.9. |=PI Nx→ ∃y y = x
This is because the quantifiers in N are plain rather than having modals in front of them.
This is important because if we put the modals in front everything is a number!
We informally extend our definition of the interpretation function I to I(N, s) = {x ∈
D(s) | M, s  Nx}. Note that by Lemma 2.9 we have {x ∈ D(s) | M, s  Nx} = {x ∈ D |
M, s  Nx}, where D is the domain of the model not the world.
Recall that ai is the unique element in D such that if |X | = i then I(#, w)(X) = ai as
defined in 1.2.5. We can now explicitly describe the interpretation of N at a world w in
terms of the ai’s, that is, the set I(N, w):
Lemma 2.10. Let w be a world and let n be the first number such that an /∈ D(w). Then
if n > 0, it follows that {0, a1, . . . , an−1} = I(N, w), and further, n = 0 iff I(N, w) = ∅.
This result shows us how the differences between our modal setting and the traditional non-
modal setting of the Grundlagen become most stark in the case of the interpretation of the
natural numbers at a world. Two things are worth highlighting. The first is that N is finite
at every world, since it is a subset of the domain of the world, and the domain of every world
is finite. The second is that objects that are not in N at one world can ‘become’ numbers
at later worlds. This doesn’t happen in the minimal model, where I(N,n) = D(n) at every
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world. But it does in the subset model. For example, I(N, {2,100}) = ∅, I(N, {0,1,3}) =
{0,1} and I(N, {0,1,2,3,100}) = {0,1,2,3}. This distinguishes ¬N(x) from the other
relations which have a certain stability; if objects stand in these relations at one world,
then they do so in all worlds in which they all exist. The formal definition of stability is
given as Definition 8. This difference is caused by there being no possibility operator at the
beginning of the definition of N. Despite this, once something is a number it remains one:
Lemma 2.11. PI S(x, y) → ✷S(x, y) holds, as does PI S
+(x, y) → ✷S+(x, y), PI
S+=(x, y) → ✷S+=(x, y) and PI Nx→ ✷Nx.
It is also worth noting that even though some cardinalities may not be numbers at ever
world, the cardinality of every set eventually becomes a natural number.
Lemma 2.12. For all w ∈ W and X ⊆ D(w), there is a world s such that R(w, s) and
#X ∈ I(N, s).
This is because # is a function, first-order converse Barcan holds, and the accessibility
relation is directed. With these preliminary results we can now show our definitions satisfy
a simple theory of arithmetic.
§3. Proving Modalized Robinson’s Q. In what follows we will prove that the modal-
ized axioms of Robinson’s Q are true on all PI models (cf. Definition 1.7). Robinson’s Q
is a weak theory of arithmetic that defines successor as an injective function that never
returns 0 and gives a recursive definition of addition and multiplication. By “modalized”
we mean that we write “necessarily for all” for “for all” and “possibly there is” for “there
is”. In other words, it is what results when we apply the Linnebo translation (mentioned
in the introduction) to the axioms of Robinson’s Q. The theory PA1 is obtained by adding
the mathematical induction schema to Q. We deal with PA1 and the proof of the induction
schema in Section 4.9
First we will show that our relations define the graphs of functions. The easiest case is
successor.
Lemma 3.1 (S1). PI ✷∀x, y, z ∈ N((Sxy ∧ Sxz) → y = z).
Proof. Let s ∈W and x, y, z ∈ I(N, s) satisfy the antecedent. As x is the predecessor in
both relations it follows by directedness that there is a w ∈W , such that R(s, w) where there
are X,X ′ ⊆ D(w) and #X = x = #X ′. As such there is a bijection g : X → X ′. There
will also be a, b ∈ D(w) such that a /∈ X , b /∈ X ′, and y = #X ∪ {a} and z = #X ′ ∪ {b}.
As a /∈ X and b /∈ X ′ we can construct h such that for all u ∈ X , h(u) = g(u) and h(a) = b.
Clearly h is a bijection, so y = #X ∪ {a} = #X ′ ∪ {b} = z. ⊣
Lemma 3.2 (S2). PI ✷∀x ∈ N✸∃y ∈ N Sxy.
Proof. As illustrated in Figure 3a, let s ∈ W and x ∈ I(N, s), it follows that x = an
for some n and, by Lemma 2.10, {0, . . .an−1} ( D(s). Further, an = #{0, . . .an−1} and
an /∈ {0, . . .an−1}. Thus, there must be a further world w accessible from w1 and a y ∈ D(w)
such that y = #{0, . . .an−1}∪{an}. It follows that Sxy at w. By Lemma 2.11 x ∈ I(N, w).
As N is closed under successor by Lemma 2.8, we have that y ∈ I(N, w). And since R is
transitive, w is accessible from s. ⊣
9A list of the non-modalized axioms can be found in Appendix A. While what we show here is that these
axioms are in the theory EPI, each of the proofs that follow can be formalised in ACA0 (cf. Appendix B).
That this is possible will ensures that all axioms proven here are also in the theory IPI (from Section 1.2).
This is a key point in the proof of Theorem 1.8.ii which we complete in section 5.
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(b) Proof of the recursion clause for addition
Figure 3
These two proofs offer a general outline of the reasoning for addition and multiplication.
For S1 this strategy is to show that whatever x is the sets assigned to y and z will have
the same cardinality. Where as for S2 one simply needs to construct a set of the correct
cardinality. For this reason we do not give the proofs for the next four lemmas.
Lemma 3.3 (A1). PI ✷∀x, y, z, z
′ ∈ N(+(x, y, z) ∧+(x, y, z′) → z = z′).
Lemma 3.4 (A2). PI ✷∀x, y ∈ N✸∃z ∈ N + (x, y, z).
Lemma 3.5 (M1). PI ✷∀x, y, z, z
′ ∈ N(×(x, y, z) ∧ ×(x, y, z′) → z = z′).
Lemma 3.6 (M2). PI ✷∀x, y ∈ N✸∃z ∈ N × (x, y, z).
We also need to show that 0 meets the right conditions to be a constant.
Lemma 3.7 (Z1). PI ✸∃x ∈ N(x = 0 ∧ ✷∀y(y = 0 → y = x)).
Proof. By the definition of N, it follows that 0 ∈ I(N, s) for any world s with 0 in the
domain. And as 0 = #∅ there is some s with 0 in the domain. The second conjunct follows
by the transitivity of identity. ⊣
We can now move on to the recursion equations in Q. We separate these into the base steps
concerning 0 and the recursive step. For the base steps, because 0 = #∅ the proofs of the
lemmas are relatively straight forward. As such we list them here without proof.
Lemma 3.8 (Q1). PI ¬✸∃x ∈ N(Sx0).
Lemma 3.9 (Q3). PI ✷∀x ∈ N + (x, 0, x).
Lemma 3.10 (Q5). PI ✷∀x ∈ N × (x, 0, 0).
What is left now is to show the recursion steps. He we only prove the case for + as one can
use the same stratagy for × and the proof is simple for S.
Lemma 3.11 (Q2). PI ✷∀x, y, z ∈ N((Sxz ∧ Syz) → x = y).
The proof simply follows from the fact that if there is a bijection between two sets X and
Y then there will be a bijection between X ∪ {a} and Y ∪ {b} if a and b aren’t in X or Y
respectively.
Lemma 3.12 (Q4).
PI ✷∀n, x0, x1, y0, y1, z ∈ N(S(x0, x1) ∧ S(y0, y1) ∧+(n, x0, y0) ∧+(n, x1, z) → y1 = z).
Proof. As illustrated in Figure 3b, let s ∈ W and n, x0, x1, y0, y1, z ∈ I(N, s) satisfy the
antecedent. We want to show that y1 = z. By directedness, we know there is a world w
containing all the objects and sets which the antecedent states possibly exist. As y1 succeeds
y0 there is a set Y0 and an object a /∈ Y0 at w such that y1 = #Y0 ∪ {a} and y0 = #Y0.
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We know y0 to be the addition of n and x0 so there are disjoint sets N and X0 such that
n = #N , x0 = #X0, and y0 = #N ∪ X0. Further there is a bijection g0 : Y0 → N ∪ X0.
Now let b be an element not in N or X0 (we can always pick w so that such an element
exists). Clearly we can define a bijection o between the singletons of a and b. Now, using
g0 and o, define the bijection g : Y0 ∪{a} → N ∪X0 ∪ {b}, as the union of g0 and o. Now as
x1 is the successor of x0, it follows that x1 = #X0 ∪ {b}. As z is the addition of n and x1
there are disjoint sets N ′ and X1 such that n = #N = #N
′, x1 = #X0 ∪ {b} = #X1 and
z = #N ∪X1. As such there are bijections f0 : X0 ∪ {b} → X1 and f1 : N → N
′. So, we
can define the bijection f : N ∪X0 ∪ {b} → N
′ ∪X1 as f0 on X0 ∪ {b} and f1 on N . Then
as z = #N ∪X1 the composition f ◦ g is a bijection proving y1 = z. ⊣
Lemma 3.13 (Q6). PI ✷∀n, x0, x1, y0, y1, z ∈ N(S(x0, x1) ∧ +(n, y0, y1) ∧ ×(n, x0, y0) ∧
×(n, x1, z) → y1 = z).




Pxy ∨ (x = u ∧ y ∈ N)} = #
⋃
x∈A1
{y | Txy} = z where A0, A1, and N are of cardinality
x0, x1, and n respectively and P is the relation given by ×(n, x0, y0) and T by ×(n, x1, z).
These results show that we have successfully defined a modalized version of Robinson’s
Q in our system. The next section will recover a modalized induction schema.
§4. Proving the Modalized Induction Schema. We have succeeded in giving a weak
theory of arithmetic in a potentially infinite setting. However, we can recover more arith-
metic by proving that when restricted to appropriate formulas a modalized version of the
induction schema is true on all PI models. The modalized induction schema is:
[ϕ(0) ∧ ✷∀x, y ∈ N(ϕ(x) ∧ S(x, y) → ϕ(y))] → ✷∀x ∈ N ϕ(x)(7)
Modalized induction does not hold for all formulas in our models, as will be shown in
Lemma 4.4. So, we need to define a subclass of the formulas in the language of potentially
infinite models for which it does hold. These we will call the inductive formulas, and in
Lemma 4.3 it will be proven that induction does hold for inductive formulas.10
Definition 4.1. The inductive terms and formulas are defined recursively as follows:
1. An inductive term is either 0 or a first-order variable.
2. If t0, t1, t2 are inductive terms then t0 = t1, S(t0, t1), +(t0, t1, t2) and ×(t0, t1, t2) are
inductive formulas.
3. Applications of the propositional connectives to inductive formulas are inductive for-
mulas.
4. If ϕ is an inductive formula then ✷∀x ∈ N ϕ and ✸∃x ∈ N ϕ are inductive formulas.
The inductive terms and formulas are a subset of the terms and formulas respectively. Any
term of the form #X is not an inductive term, and indeed no term or formula with a free
second-order variable is inductive. Likewise N0, ∀z(x = z) and ∃y(S0y) are not inductive
formulas, while ✷∀z ∈ N(x = z) and ✸∃y ∈ N(S0y) are.
A formula ϕ is stable when:
PI ϕ→ ✷ϕ.(8)
10This terminology is used to distinguish between these formulas and other for which induction does not
hold. Hopefully no confusion will be caused by the distinct uses of the term inductive formulas elsewhere
in the literature.
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Stability is taken from Linnebo’s (2013, p. 211) work on set theory in a modal setting. It
means once a formula has been made true it stays true. As we saw in Lemma 2.11, S, S+,
S+=, and N are all stable and an example of an unstable formula is ¬N. Fortunately, the
inductive formulas all have the property of being stable, as we will now prove. This will
allow us to prove induction for these formulas.
Lemma 4.2. If ϕ is an inductive formula then PI ϕ→ ✷ϕ.
Proof. In what follows we prove by induction on the complexity of the inductive formulas
that both ϕ→ ✷ϕ and ✸ϕ→ ϕ. The second condition is included to deal with the case of
negation.
Base case: x = y and x = 0: The result follows from the evaluation of #∅ being rigid and
the identity relation being interpreted as the identity from the metalanguage. Note that
for S,+, and × that ✸ψ → ψ follows simply because R is transitive and they start with
a ✸. S(x, y): See Lemma 2.11. +(x, y, z): Assume that M, w  +(a, b, c). It follows that
there exists a world w′ accessible from w and nonintersecting sets A,B ⊆ D(w′) satisfying
+. Let s be a world such that R(w, s). Then by directedness, there is a world s′ such that
R(s, s′) and R(w′, s′), and A,B ⊆ D(s′). So +(a, b, c) holds at s. ×(x, y, z): The reasoning
is essentially the same as that used for +.
Now we proceed to the induction step. We will only show the case of the quantifier as ¬
and ∧ proceed as one would expect. ✸∃x ∈ N ψ: Assume M, s  ✸✸∃x ∈ N ψ. It follows
by transitivity that M, s  ✸∃x ∈ N ψ. Now we show that (✸∃x ∈ N ψ) → (✷✸∃x ∈ N ψ).
First take a world w such that ✸∃x ∈ N ψ holds at w. Then take worlds s, w′ such that
R(w, s), R(w,w′), ∃x ∈ N ψ holds at w′ and we want to show ✸∃x ∈ N ψ holds at s. At
w′ there is an a ∈ D(w′) such that a ∈ I(N, w′) and ψ(a) holds at w′. So, by Lemma 2.11,
Na → ✷Na holds at w′ and by the induction hypothesis, ψ(a) → ✷ψ(a). Let s′ be such
that R(s, s′) and R(w′, s′), such a world exists by directedness. It follows that Na and ψ(a)
hold at s′ and as s′ is accessible from s we have proven ✸∃x ∈ N ψ holds at s. ⊣
We can now prove that the modalized induction schema holds for all inductive formulas.
We do this by showing the more general result that induction holds for all stable formulas.
Lemma 4.3. If ϕ is stable, then
PI [ϕ(0) ∧ ✷∀x, y ∈ N(ϕ(x) ∧ S(x, y) → ϕ(y))] → ✷∀x ∈ N ϕ(x).
Proof. Let w be a world. Further, we assume the antecedent of the induction schema
holds so let ϕ(0) and ✷∀x, y ∈ N(ϕ(x) ∧ S(x, y) → ϕ(y)) hold at w. Let s be a world
accessible from w and let a ∈ I(N, s). We will show that ϕ(a) at s. If a = 0 then, as ϕ is
stable, we are done so assume not.
As a ∈ I(N, s), if we prove ∀x, y(ϕ(x) ∧ Nx ∧ S(x, y) → ϕ(y) ∧ Ny) and ∀x(S(0, x) →
ϕ(x) ∧ Nx) hold at s then we have satisfied the antecedent of S+0a and so it follows that
ϕ(a) ∧ Na at s.
At s we have ∀x, y ∈ N(ϕ(x) ∧ S(x, y) → ϕ(y)). We also have that if x ∈ I(N, s), and
S(x, y) hold at s then by Lemma 2.8 that y ∈ I(N, s). This proves ∀x, y(ϕ(x)∧Nx∧S(x, y) →
ϕ(y) ∧ Ny) at s.
From a ∈ I(N, s) it follows that 0 ∈ D(s). Assume x ∈ D(s) and S0x, as 0 ∈ D(s) it
follows by Lemma 2.7 that x ∈ I(N, s). It then follows by the stability of ϕ that ϕ(0) at s.
As such we have the antecedent of ∀x, y ∈ N(ϕ(x) ∧ S(x, y) → ϕ(y)) so we get ϕ(x). And
from this it follows that ∀x(S(0, x) → ϕ(x) ∧Nx) holds at s. ⊣
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So we have proven the modalized induction axiom restricted to inductive formulas. But
we cannot prove modalized induction for all formulas in the language of potentially infinite
models, as the following counterexample shows.
Lemma 4.4. If ϕ(x) is ∀z(z = x), then
2PI [ϕ(0) ∧ ✷∀x, y ∈ N(ϕ(x) ∧ S(x, y) → ϕ(y))] → ✷∀x ∈ N ϕ(x).
Proof. It is sufficient to show there is a model and a world in the model where this
statement is false. Take the minimal model from Example 1.4 and world 0, where D(0) =
{0}. Clearly M,0  ∀z(z = 0). Let w ∈ W be such that R(0, w) and assume that for
all x, y ∈ I(N, w), that ∀z(z = x) and S(x, y) hold at w. As everything in the domain is
equal to x it follows that y = x and so ∀z(z = y) at w. So M,0  ✷∀x, y ∈ N(∀z(z =
x) ∧ S(x, y) → ∀z(z = y)). But it does not follow that ✷∀x ∈ N ∀z(z = x), because 1 ∈ W
is a counterexample as D(1) = {0,1}. ⊣
§5. Proof of Theorem 1.8. We now have almost all the pieces needed to prove Theo-
rem 1.8. However, before we do that we need to discuss what a translation and interpretation
are in our setting because we are moving between logics.
Intuitively, a translation between two languages starts with instructions on how to rewrite
atomic formulas in one language into the other language. It does not make any changes
to the propositional connectives but can restrict the quantifiers to objects meeting some
conditions. In the current setting, however, we need a formal definition of what is to
count as a translation when the underlying logics are different. This notion should, at the
very least, capture the Linnebo translation. We offer the following definition as a minimal
condition on any translation, though more will need to be done to ensure a widely applicable
definition of translation and interpretation between logics.
Definition 5.1. Let LA and LB be two logics extending first-order predicate logic, de-
fined by the languages LA and LB and derivability relations ⊢LA and ⊢LB respectively. A
generalised translation is given by a recursive map (·)G : LA → LB which preserves free
variables and a domain formula δ(x) ∈ LB , such that the map is compositional on the
propositional connectives and where for all unnested formulas11 ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ containing
free variables x1, . . . , xm one has the following:
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢LA ψ ⇒ δ(x1), . . . , δ(xm), ϕ
G




What we have done so far is an informal translation from the first-order language of
arithmetic into the signature of the potentially infinite models. In Section 2 we showed how
the atomic formulas could be translated. Further, the modalized versions of the axioms
of PA1 proven in Sections 3 and 4 are the translations of PA1’s axioms via the translation
found in Section 2 and the Linnebo translation for the quantifiers.
While it has been set out in previous sections, for the sake of definiteness we here record
the translation explicitly. We will call this translation (·)F , as it is a Fregean translation.
Three things are worth noting before we lay out the translation. The first is that the domain
formula associated to this interpretation is N from Definition 2.6. The second is that the
range of this translation is the inductive formulas from Definition 4.1. The third is that
11An unnested formula is one where the atomic subformulas of a formula contain at most one constant,
function or relation (Hodges, 1993, p. 58). We only give conditions for unnested formulas. So, for example,
Sxy and +(x, y, z) are unnested but S0x and +(0, 0, z) are nested. Every formula is equivalent to an unnested
one (Hodges, 1993, p. 59, Cor 2.6.2). As such the translation can be expanded to unnested formulas using
this equivalence.
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11-13 are the same definitions given in 3, 2.2 and 2.3. We have not changed the definitions
we are working with. Rather, we merely show how these definitions can be used to define
the interpretation function (·)F .
0F ≡#∅,(10)
SabF ≡✸∃G∃u[Gu ∧ (b = #G) ∧ (a = #G ∪ {u})],(11)
+(a, b, c)F ≡✸∃X,Y (a=#X ∧ b=#Y ∧ c=#X ∪ Y ∧X ∩ Y = ∅),(12)
×(a, b, c)F ≡✸∃X,P [#X = b ∧ ∀x ∈ X(#{y | Pxy} = a) ∧
∀x, y ∈ X(x 6= y → {z | Pxz} ∩ {z | Pyz} = ∅) ∧#
⋃
x∈X
{y | Pxy} = c],
(13)
(ψ ∧ χ)F ≡ψF ∧ χF ,(14)
(¬ψ)F ≡¬ψF ,(15)
(∀xψ)F ≡✷∀x(N(x) → ψF),(16)
(∀Xnψ)F ≡✷∀Xn(∀x1, . . . , xn(X
nx1 . . . xn → N(x1) ∧ · · · ∧ N(xn)) → ψ
F).(17)
To see that this is a generalised translation all that remains to be shown is that deduction
is preserved by our translation. We need this result for both EPI and IPI.
12
Lemma 5.2. Let ϕ0, . . . , ϕn, ψ be unnested formulas in the language of PA
1 with free vari-
ables v0, . . . , vm, it follows that if ϕ0, . . . , ϕn ⊢ ψ, then N(v0), . . . ,N(vm), ϕ
F




Further, it is PA1-provable that if ϕ0, . . . , ϕn ⊢ ψ then ACA0 ⊢ “N(v0), . . . ,N(vm), ϕ
F
0 , . . . ,
ϕFn PI ψ
F”.
The first part of this Lemma is similar to Linnebo (2013, Thm. 5.4.). But he proves a
version of this which does not restrict the quantifiers to a domain. The modification to our
case is simple and so we omit the proof.
On its own a translation is not very interesting. However, a translation is an interpretation
if the translations of the axioms of the interpreted theory can be proven in the interpreting
theory.
Definition 5.3. Let TA and TB be LA and LB theories respectively, where a theory is
a set of sentences not necessarily closed under deduction. A generalised translation (·)G :
LA → LB interprets TA in TB, if for all LA unnested sentences χ:
TA ⊢LA χ⇒ TB ⊢LB χ
G(18)
It is a recursive interpretation if the collection of LA and LB formulas are recursive, TA
and TB are also recursive, as is (·)
G , and there are recursive maps from proofs to proofs
which witness the truth of equations (9) and (18). If T extends PA1, then say that the
interpretation is T-verifiable if the recursive functions are provably total in T and if the
universal closures of the arithmetized versions of 9 and 18 are provable in T.
So, the proofs of Sections 3 and 4 show our translation is an interpretation of PA1 in EPI.
However, to show it is an interpretation in IPI a certain level of caution is needed because IPI
does not have a background derivability relation. To resolve this, we take ϕ0, . . . , ϕn ⊢LPI ϕ
to be ACA0 ⊢ “ϕ0, . . . , ϕn PI ϕ”, where this is as defined in Appendix B. And, of course IPI
12Recall that we formalised IPI in ACA0, and those interested in the nuts and bolts are directed to
Appendix B.
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is just as defined in (2) of section 1, namely the set of sentences ϕ such that ACA0 ⊢ “ PI ϕ”.
We then need to show the following:
Lemma 5.4. For all sentences ϕ in the language of PA1, if PA1 ⊢ ϕ then ACA0 ⊢ “ PI
ϕF”. Further, it is PA1-provable that if PA1 ⊢ ϕ then ACA0 ⊢ “ PI ϕ
F”.
Proof. By Lemmas 3.2-3.6 and 4.2 and 4.3 we know that if ϕ is an axiom of PA1 then
ACA0 ⊢ “ PI ϕ
F”. Assume PA1 ⊢ ϕ not an axiom, then there are n axioms of PA1,
ϕ0, . . . , ϕn, such that ϕ0, . . . , ϕn ⊢ ϕ. Then as we can always take the universal closure of
axioms and ϕ is a sentence it follows by Lemma 5.2 that ACA0 ⊢ “ϕ
F




Given that the axioms are PI valid, it follows that ACA0 ⊢ “ PI ϕ
F”. ⊣
This final piece gives us the proof of:
Theorem 1.8.ii.. There is a generalised translation from the language of PA1 to the
second-order modal language with octothorpe that interprets PA1 in IPI. Further, this is
a PA1-verifiable generalised interpretation.
To prove the first half of Theorem 1.8 we need to define formulas that pick out the numbers
in PA1 and EPI. In PA
1 let τ0(x) ≡ (x = 0) and τn+1(x) ≡ ∃y(τn(y) ∧ Syx). In EPI let
σ0(x) ≡ (x = 0) and σn+1(x) ≡ ✸∃y ∈ N(σn(y) ∧ Syx). Note that (τ0(x))
F ≡ (x = 0)F ≡
σ0(x) and (τn+1(x))
F ≡ (∃y(τn(y) ∧ Syx))
F ≡ ✸∃y ∈ N((τn(y))
F ∧ Syx) ≡ σn+1(x). With
this we can state the following preliminary Lemma; we omit the proof which is long but not
illuminating:
Lemma 5.5. For every k ≥ 0 and every unnested formula θ(x1, . . . , xk) in the signature
of PA1 and every k-tuple of natural numbers n1, . . . , nk one has that :




F (x1, . . . , xk))(19)
In the case of k = 0, this is to say: for every unnested sentence θ in the signature of PA1
one has that
N |= θ =⇒ PI θ
F(20)
Theorem 1.8.i follows from (20) of Lemma 5.5. This give us our proof of:
Theorem 1.8.i.. There is a generalised translation from the language of PA1 to the second-
order modal language with octothorpe that interprets TA1 in EPI.
§6. Proof of Theorem 1.9. It has been shown by Linnebo and Shapiro (2019, §7) that
the Linnebo translation cannot interpret comprehension because modalized comprehension
requires the existences of a set of all possibly existing things. However, this leaves open the
question of whether there is a different translation which can interpret PA2. Here we will
demonstrate that there is no translation from TA2 to EPI nor from PA
2 to IPI by proving
Theorem 1.9, our second main theorem. The first part of Theorem 1.9 follows from relatively
simple Tarskian considerations:
Theorem 1.9.i. There is no generalised translation from the language of PA2 to the
second-order modal language with octothorpe that interprets TA2 in EPI.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that there is an interpretation (·)G that interprets
TA
2 in EPI. Note that as TA
2 is complete it follows that this is a faithful interpretation;
i.e. if PI ϕ
G then N  ϕ. As EPI is Π
1
1-definable it follows that there is a predicate P such
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that for all ϕ in the second-order modal language with octothorpe we have PI ϕ if and only
if N  P (“ϕ”). (Here we use quotation marks for Gödel numbering for both the language
of PA2 and the second-order modal language with octothorpe.) But then as generalised
translations are recursive we can represent (·)G in N as g. It follows that P (g(“ψ”)), where
ψ is in the language of PA2, is a truth predicate for TA2. But this contradicts Tarski’s
theorem. ⊣
The proof of the second part of the theorem is trickier and requires Gödelian consider-
ations. Recall the definition of T-verifiable generalised translation and interpretation from
Definitions 5.1 and 5.3 in Section 5. There we proved that we have a PA1-verifiable interpre-
tation of PA1 in IPI by Lemma 5.4. Given that we defined IPI ⊢ ϕ as ACA0 ⊢ “PI ϕ”, that is
PA
1 ⊢ ∀ϕ[“PA1 ⊢ ϕ” → “ACA0 ⊢ “ PI ϕ
F””]. Here we show that there is no PA2-verifiable
interpretation of PA2 in IPI. We can write this as: there is no generalised translation (·)
G
from the language of PA2 to the second-order modal language with octothorpe such that
PA
2 ⊢ ∀ϕ[“PA2 ⊢ ϕ” → “ACA0 ⊢ “ PI ϕ
G””].
Theorem 1.9.ii. There is no generalised translation from the language of PA2 to the
second-order modal language with octothorpe that PA2-verifiably interprets PA2 in IPI.
Proof. The systems Π1k-CA0 are subsystems of PA
2 that have comprehension for Π1k
formulas. As proofs are finite and so can only use finitely many instances of the compre-
hension schema any interpretation which is PA2-verifiable will also be Π1k-CA0-verifiable for
some k ≥ 1. Let ϕ1, . . . , ϕn be a finite axiomatisation of Π
1
k-CA0 for some k ≥ 1 (Simpson,
2009, pp. 303, 311–2). We will show, from the assumption that there is a Π1k-CA0-verifiable
translation (·)G from the languge of PA2 to the second-order modal language with octothorpe
that interprets PA2 in IPI, that Π
1
k-CA0 proves its own consistency. This contradicts Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem and so shows that no such (·)G can exist.
Note that PA2 ⊢ ϕ1, . . . , ϕn as all Π
1
k-CA0 are subsystems of PA
2. We are assuming that
(·)G interprets PA2 in IPI, so it follows that ACA0 ⊢ “ PI ϕ
G
1 , . . . , ϕ
G
n”. Let A be a model of
Π1k-CA0 for some k. So, we have A  “ PI ϕ
G
1 , . . . , ϕ
G
n”. If M is the minimal model from
Example 1.4 relative to A then we have then we have A  “M  ϕG1 , . . . , ϕ
G
n”.
Now we show that A  ¬Prvϕ1,...,ϕn(ψ∧¬ψ), that is the consistency of Π
1
k-CA0. Assume
for a contradiction that A  ∃πPrfϕ1,...,ϕn(π, ψ ∧ ¬ψ). Then as (·)
G is a Π1k-CA0-verifiable
interpretation it follows A  PrfACA0(π




Recall that Π11-CA0 proves Σ
1
1-reflection for ACA0 (cf. Simpson (2009) Theorem VII.6.9.(4)
p. 298 and Theorem VII.7.6.(1) p. 305). As Π11-CA0 ⊆ Π
1
k-CA0, this means that for any Π
1
1
statement ψ we know Π1k-CA0 proves PrvACA0(ψ) → ψ. For all ψ, we know that “ PI ψ”
is Π11 and similarly for the local derivability relation (see Appendix B). It follows that
A  “ϕG1 , . . . , ϕ
G
n PI ψ
G ∧ ¬ψG” and as A  “M  ϕG1 , . . . , ϕ
G
n”. It follows that A  “M 
ψG ∧ ¬ψG”. And so A  “M |= ψG” and A  “M |= ¬(ψG)”. ⊣
We have now shown the two main results set out in the introduction.
§7. Conclusion. We started with the worry that Hume’s Principle had only infinite
models and so any claim that it was analytic would mean that the claim that there are
infinitely many objects is analytic. This worry has been noted before in the literature on
neo-logicism, but little has been done to address it. Hale and Wright (2001) state that
without this the neo-logicist project cannot even get off the ground:
To require of an acceptable abstraction that it should not be (even) weakly infla-
tionary [that is require a countable infinity] would stop the neo-Fregean project
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dead in its tracks, before it even got moving (as it were). It will be clear that
I think there is no good ground to impose such a requirement, and I shall not
discuss it further. (Hale and Wright, 2001, pp. 417–8)
In this paper we have explored the potentially infinite as one way to address this worry. The
move to the potentially infinite does not rid us of posited infinities. We still require there
to be an infinity of worlds and an infinity of objects across the worlds. But these infinities
are less metaphysically questionable. So, for example, while Putnam and Hodes objected
to the positing of actual infinities they allowed for possible infinities. And one could always
try to further avoid the commitment by adopting an instrumentalist attitude towards the
metatheory.
We have shown that the theory of potentially infinite models interprets first-order Peano
arithmetic or first-order true arithmetic, depending on the strength of our meta-language.
But we cannot interpret the equivalent second-order arithmetic theory. The difficulty seems
to be the non-existence of a set of all the numbers across all the worlds. As our models
are supposed to capture the idea of the potential infinite, we do not want the set of all the
numbers across all the worlds to exist. It makes sense that the potential infinite does not
capture the infinite progression of the natural numbers as well as actual infinity and this
might go some way to explaining why we get the weaker first-order theory.
This allows a fuller understanding of the role of the potentially infinite in the foundation of
mathematics. Unlike Hodes, we see that a certain amount of mathematics can be recovered,
though some other story would need to be told about more advanced mathematics. It also
offers evidence that the ontological commitments that come with Hume’s Principle, and
which make some reject the claim that its truth is analytic, cannot be avoided by moving
to the modal setting if one wants full second-order Peano arithmetic. For in weakening our
ontological commitments, we also weakened the mathematical theory which we can recover.
§Appendix A. Formal Theories. Here we will spell out the theories other than EPI
and IPI which are used in the proofs above. Unlike EPI and IPI none of these are modal
theories, however, most are second-order theories.
The weakest theory we consider is first-order Robinson’s Q. For a more complete reference
see, for example, Hájek and Pudlák (1998, p. 28).
Definition A.1. Q is the usual formalization of Robinson’s arithmetic. It consists of the
universal closure of the following axioms:
s(x) 6= 0; (Q1) s(y) = s(z) → y = z;(Q2)
x+ 0 = x; (Q3) x+ s(y) = s(x+ y);(Q4)
x× 0 = 0; (Q5) x× s(y) = (x× y) + y.(Q6)
Note that in the body of the text we do not use this formulation but rather one with
relations instead than functions.13 We have offered this formulation for readability. The
relation formulation gives you the obvious translation of the above, plus an additional 6
axioms ensuring that the relations S,+,× are the graphs of functions.
We also consider the extensions of Q to PA1 by the addition of the first-order induction
schema, and PA2 by the addition of the second-order induction axiom and Comprehension
Schema. PA1 is a first-order theory, but PA2 is a second-order theory.
13We use a capital S for the relational successor and lower case s for the functional.
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Definition A.2. PA1 is Q plus the induction schema, where ϕ is a first-order formula:
(ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x(ϕx → ϕ(s(x)))) → ∀xϕ(x)(Induction Schema (IS))
PA
2 is Q plus the induction axiom and Comprehension Schema:
∀P [(P0 ∧ ∀x(Px→ P (s(x)))) → ∀xPx](Induction Axiom (IS))
∀ȳ, Ȳ ∃X∀x(X(x) ↔ ϕ(x, ȳ, Ȳ ))(Comprehension Schema (CS))
In the Comprehension Schema ϕ can be any formula of the language of PA2 in which X
does not occur free.
Again in the body of the text we use the natural adaptation to the setting of relations rather
than functions. There are also two theories we use that are second-order and between PA2
and PA1 in strength. They both restrict comprehension. So, we first need to define the
formulas we restrict to:
Definition A.3. (Simpson, 2009, I.3.1, p. 6) An Arithmetical formula is a formula in the
language of PA2 which does not contain any set quantifiers, though it may contain free set
variables.
With this we can state ACA0:
Definition A.4. (Simpson, 2009, I.3.2, p. 7) ACA0 is Q plus the Induction Axiom and
Arithmetical Comprehension:
∀ȳ, Ȳ ∃X∀x(X(x) ↔ ϕ(x, ȳ, Ȳ ))(Arithmetical Comprehension Schema (ACS))
Where ϕ has to be an arithmetical formula and X may not occur free.
Note that as every formula of PA1 is arithmetical, and ACA0 contains the second-order
induction axiom, every instance of the first-order induction schema is provable in ACA0.
The next theories of arithmetic to be considered here are the Π1k-CA0 which are used




Definition A.5. (Simpson, 2009, I.5.1, p. 16) A Π11 formula is a formula in the language
of PA2 of the form ∀X1, . . . , Xnϕ where X1, . . . , Xn are set variables and ϕ is an arithmetical
formula.
A Σ11 formula is a formula in the language of PA
2 of the form ∃X1, . . . , Xnϕ whereX1, . . . , Xn
are set variables and ϕ is an arithmetical formula.
A Π1k formula is a formula in the language of PA
2 of the form ∀X1, . . . , Xnϕ whereX1, . . . , Xn
are set variables and ϕ is a Σ1k−1 formula.
A Σ1k formula is a formula in the language of PA
2 of the form ∃X1, . . . , Xnϕ whereX1, . . . , Xn
are set variables and ϕ is Π1k−1 formula.
The definition of Π1k-CA0 is much like the definition of ACA0, except that the restriction on
the comprehension axiom is broadened to include all Π1k formulas:
Definition A.6. (Simpson, 2009, I.5.2, p. 17) Π1k-CA0 is Q plus the Induction Axiom
and Π1k Comprehension:
∀ȳ, Ȳ ∃X∀x(X(x) ↔ ϕ(x, ȳ, Ȳ ))(Π1k Comprehension Schema (Π
1
kCS))
Where ϕ has to be a Π1k formula and X may not occur free.
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We can define the intended model of these theories. Let N1 be {ω, 0, s,+,×} where each
term is interpreted as it is in the metatheory and N2 be N1 with P(ωn) as the domain of the
second-order quantifiers. N1 is the intended model of Q and PA1, while N2 is the intended
model of PA2, ACA0, and Π
1
k-CA0 for all k. As is well known, by Gödel’s incompleteness
theorems none of the theories we have seen so far are complete. We can define the complete
theories of these models:
Definition A.7. Let TA1 be {ϕ | N1  ϕ} and TA2 be {ϕ | N2  ϕ}.
For the sake of completeness, we here define Hume’s Principle (HP2). This system is
second-order also and consists of the cardinality principle displayed in Equation HP on
page 1, the full Comprehension Schema, as in PA2, and full comprehension for binary rela-
tions:
∀ȳ, Ȳ ∃X∀x, z(X(x, z) ↔ ϕ(x, z, ȳ, Ȳ ))(Binary Comprehension Schema (BCS))
Comprehension for binary relations is required because the definition of HP2 quantifies over
bijections and when spelt out fully this turns out to be the claim that there is a second-order
binary relation which is the graph of a bijection between the two sets.
§Appendix B. Formal definition of IPI. In the introduction we gave IPI as the set {ϕ |
ACA0 ⊢ ‘PI ϕ’}. Here we will layout explicitly what we mean by defining the arithmetization
of PI in ACA0.
It is importaint to note that the second-order variables in IPI are taken to first-order
variables in ACA0. If all the first-order variables of IPI are of the form xi and all the second-
order variables of IPI are of the form Yj then let all the first-order variables of ACA0 be of
the form xi and Yj , and the second-order variables of ACA0 be of the form Zv. In practice
we will not stick to this strict distinction, but it can always be implemented by renaming
the variables.
We do not restrict the domain of the first-order variables of IPI; there is no need to pick
out a subset of the domain of a model of ACA0. However, the second-order variables of IPI
need to be restricted to codes for finite sets of numbers ordered by strict less than. This isn’t
difficult, we can simply borrow the coding found in the proof of incompleteness. A more
complete explication can be found in Simpson (2009, Ch. 2.2). The second-order variables
are required to be to some sequence π(0)n0 + · · ·+ π(m)nm where π(i) gives the ith prime
and n0 < n1 < · · · < nm. Let Seq(Y ) be the name of the relation that ensures Y has the
above properties. Further, let nSeq(Y ) mean that Y codes n-tuples of numbers. We will
use this to code relations and relational variables. If x is the number of a sequence then let
[x]i be the ith element and ln(x) is the length of x.
We want to code PI models as sets of natural numbers. We know that we can always
combine countably many countably infinite sets (just code n a member of the ith set as
2i + 3n). As such we will just show how to code W,R,D,#, a as separate sets of natural
numbers. Further, with R,D,#, a we will talk about pairs (x, y), this should be understood
as standing for the code 2x + 3y.
(B.1) Let W be infinite (∀x ∈W∃y ∈W (y > x)),14
(B.2) let R be such that
(a) for all (i, j) ∈ R we have that i, j ∈ W ,
14Recall that our definition demanded that our set of worlds be countable. We cannot capture this in
ACA0 in the sense that ACA0 has none standard models but we will have that we do not have more worlds
than ACA0 thinks there are natural numbers, which is sufficent for the role this plays in the proofs.
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(b) ∀x ∈W R(x, x) (reflexive),
(c) ∀x, y, z ∈ W (R(x, y) ∧R(y, z) → R(x, z)) (transitive),
(d) ∀x, y ∈ W (R(x, y) ∧R(y, x) → x = y) (anti-symmetric),
(e) ∀x, y ∈ W ∃z ∈W (R(x, z) ∧R(y, z)) (directed),
(B.3) let D be such that
(a) D(w, Y ) implies that w ∈W and Seq(Y ),
(b) ∀w ∈W∃Y ∈ Seq(D(w, Y ) ∧ ln(Y ) > 0) (every world has at least one element),
(c) D is the graph of a function from W to Seq,
(d) if R(i, j) and i 6= j and D(i,X) and D(j, Y ) then ∃u∀v([X ]v 6= [Y ]u) (there is
something in Y not in X) and ∀v < ln(X)∃u([X ]v = [Y ]u) (everything in X is in
Y ),
(B.4) let a be such that for each n there is exactly one x such that a(n, x) and if a(n, x) and
a(m,x) then n = m, we then define #(Y, x) as Seq(Y ) ∧ a(ln(Y ), x).
Given a set of numbers M we will write M ∈ PIM to signify the set meets (B.1)–(B.4).
We define sb (subset) as follows Y ∈ sb(X) iff Seq(Y ) ∧ ∀i < ln(Y )∃j([X ]j = [Y ]i). In
defining the arithmetisation note that we add free-variables for the model and the world,
we will use WM , RM , DM ,#M , but these can be defined in terms of the model. So, if ϕ
is a formula in the modal second-order language with octothorpe we translate it to some
ψ(w,WM , RM , DM ,#M ) in the language of arithmetic. We define the arithmetisation as
follows:
(xi = xj)
∗ ≡xi = xj(21)
(xi = #Yj)
∗ ≡#M (Yj , xi)(22)
(Yjxi)
∗ ≡∃u(xi = [Yj ]u)(23)
(∀xϕ)∗ ≡∀x(∃Y ∈ Seq(DM (w, Y ) ∧ ∃u(x = [Y ]u)) → (ϕ)
∗)(24)
(∀Y ϕ)∗ ≡∀Y ∈ Seq(∃X ∈ Seq(DM (w,X) ∧ Y ∈ sb(X)) → (ϕ)
∗)(25)
(∀Pnϕ)∗ ≡∀Pn ∈ nSeq(26)




∃j[X ]j = xi)) → (ϕ)
∗)
(✷ϕ)∗ ≡∀s ∈WM (RM (w, s) → (ϕ)
∗[w/s])(27)
where we commute over the logical connectives. This means that every formula arithmetised
is arithmetical as defined in Appendix A. For example, ✷∀v✸∃Z(v = #Z) becomes
(28) ∀s ∈WM (RM (w, s) → ∀v(∃Y (DM (s, Y ) ∧ ∃u(v = [Y ]u) →
∃s′ ∈ WM (RM (s, s
′) ∧ ∃Z ∈ Seq(∃X(DM (w,X) ∧ Z ∈ sb(X) ∧#M (Z, v))))).
Note ‘ PI ϕ’ means ∀M ∈ PIM∀w ∈ WM (ϕ)
∗. It follows that this is then a Π11 formula.
Hence, if one were proceeding very formally, we would define IPI as the set of all the ϕ such
that ACA0 ⊢ ∀M ∈ PIM∀w ∈WM (ϕ)
∗.
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